Robert H. Nigohosian v. Workforce Appeals Board, Department of Workforce Services and Salt Lake Community College : Brief of Petitioner by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2008
Robert H. Nigohosian v. Workforce Appeals Board,
Department of Workforce Services and Salt Lake
Community College : Brief of Petitioner
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joseph E. Hatch; Attorney for Petitioner.
Suzan Pixton; Workforce Appeals Board Department of Workforce Services; Attorney for
Respondent.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Nigohosian v. Workforce Appeals Board, No. 20080945 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1284
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBERT H. NIGOHOSIAN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD, 
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE 
SERVICES, and SALT LAKE 
COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
Respondents, 
Appeal No. 20080945 
Agency Case No. 08-R-00498 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
FROM FINAL DECISION OF THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD 
Suzann Pixton (2608) 
Workforce Appeals Board 
Department of Workforce Services 
140 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0244 
Attorney for Respondents 
Workforce Appeals Board and 
Department Of Workforce Services 
Joseph E. Hatch (1415) 
5295 So. Commerce Drive 
Suite 200 
Murray, UT 84107 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Robert H. Nigohosian 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
FEB 2 3 2009 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBERT H. NIGOHOSIAN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD, 
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE 
SERVICES, and SALT LAKE 
COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
Respondents, 
Appeal No. 20080945 
Agency Case No. 08-R-00498 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
FROM FINAL DECISION OF THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD 
Suzann Pixton (2608) 
Workforce Appeals Board 
Department of Workforce Services 
140 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0244 
Attorney for Respondents 
Workforce Appeals Board and 
Department Of Workforce Services 
Joseph E. Hatch (1415) 
5295 So. Commerce Drive 
Suite 200 
Murray, UT 84107 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Robert H. Nigohosian 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
STATUTORY AND ADMINSITRATIVE RULES PROVISION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 7 
THE APPEALS BOARD ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
REFUSING TO REOPEN THE RECORD TO INCLUDE 
THE FACULTY PANEL RECOMMENDATION 
CONCLUSION 14 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 15 
APPENDIX 16 
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 16 
DATED AUGUST 19, 2008 
DECISION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD 
DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 2008 
20 
DECISION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD 
DATED OCTOBER 16, 2008 
RECOMMENDATION FROM SITTING HEARING 
COMMITTEE DATED SEPTEMBER 17, 2008 
i i i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED: 
Adams v. Board of Review of Indus Comm, 821 P. 2d 1 (Utah, 1991) 
Arrow Legal Solutions Group P.C. v. Department of Workforce Services, 
et. al., 180 P. 3d. 830 (Ut, App. Court, 2007) 
Ekshtevn v. Department of Workforce Services, 
45 P. 3d 175 (Ut. App.Court, 2002) 
STATUTES CITED: 
Utah Code Annotated § 35A-1-304(2) 
Utah Code Annotated § 35A-4-406(2)(a)-(c) 
Utah Code Annotated § 35A-4-508(8)(a) 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(a) 
RULES CITED: 
Utah Administrative Code R994-405-202 
Utah Administrative Code R994-508-117(5) 
Utah Administrative Code R994-508-118(1)(3) 
Utah Administrative Code R994-508-401(2)-(3) 
iv 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
The Utah Court . f Appeals has original jurisdiction over the filed Petition 
for Review pursuant u> , .Lm ^ o ^ .Annotated §§35A-4-508(8)(a) and 78-2a-
3(2)(a). 
STATEMFX • • • ^ M ' * • 
The Petitioner presents the following issi v r : • 3 
Appeals Board abuse its discretion by refusing to consider the Recommends w on s 
o; i.K lilting iieaiing Committee of the Employer, Salt Lake Community College, 
issih: I MI Scpieii il>c 1 L\ 200M I'LJiieyn v. Department of Workforce Services, 
H
 tl .v an ongiiial proceeding 
before this Court, the ISSMC is pirsn-inl mi «ln; lusl \K^JV <»I i^c IV(i|mn lo» Review 
dated November 14, 2008. 
SI A M11'< III "i \JND ADMINISTRATIVE RULE PROVISIONS 
im 11111 siai . . . . . . ,,viu4lJu. -uies are subject to interpretation 
by this Court with llu^ IVpiin 1 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35A-1-304(2) reads as follows: 
On appeal, the Workforce Appeals Board may on the basis of the evidence 
previously submitted in the case, or upon the basis of any additional 
evidence it requires: 
(a) affirm the decision of the administrative law judge; 
(b) modify the decision of the administrative law judge; or 
(c) reverse the findings, conclusions, and decision of the administrative 
law judge. [Emphasis added] 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35A-4-406(2)(a)-(c) reads as follows: 
(a) Jurisdiction over benefits shall be continuous. 
(b) Upon its own initiative or upon application of any party affected, 
the division [Division of Adjudication! may on the basis of change in 
conditions or because of a mistake as to facts, review a decision 
allowing or disallowing in whole or in part a claim for benefits. 
(c) The review shall be conducted in accordance with rules adopted by the 
department and may result in a new decision that may award, terminate, 
continue, increase, or decrease benefits, or may result in referral of the 
claim to an appeal tribunal. [Emphasis Added] 
UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE R 994-508-401(2) AND (3), reads as 
follows: 
(2) After a determination or decision has become final, the 
Department may, on its own initiative or upon the request of any interested 
party, review a determination or decision and issue a new decision or 
determination, if appropriate, if there has been a change of conditions or 
a mistake as to facts. The reconsideration must be made at, or with the 
approval of, the level where the last decision on the case was made or is 
2 
currently pending. 
(a) A change in conditions may include a Junge in the ia-A wnich 
would make reconsideration necessary rness to the parties w ho - ere 
adversely affected by the law change. A change in conditions may a -o 
include an unforeseeable change in the personal circumstances of the 
claimant or emplover which woi lid have made it reasonable not w> ill a 
timely appeal, 
(b) A mistake 
the basis for the decision. A mistake as to facts may include information 
which is misunderstood or misinterpreted, but does not include an error in 
the application of the act or the rules provided the decision is made under the 
correct section of the act. A mistake as to facts can only be found if it was 
inadvertent. If the party alleging the mistake intentionally provided the 
wrong information or intentionally withheld information, the Department 
will not exercise jurisdiction under this paragraph. 
^ -.lie Depaniiiem .^  noi required to take jurisdiction in all cases 
w here ifieic is a change in conditions or a mistake as to facts. r n -
Department will weigh the administrative burden of makim; :« 
redetermination against the requirements of fairness and the oppiM uinsuo 01 
the parties affected to file an appeal. The Department may decline to lake 
;a; isdiction if the redetermination would have little or no e - *>rt \ h mphusis 
Added] 
STA I EB 1EN I OF THE CASE 
rin fVtitiniiii mi I'oiltiii mi I hn.',oliosi;iii (lieieiiialui i\n lMi tliuj IIII | nn 
June 8, 2G08, Mr. Nigohosian \\\v\ IIIM han»nl tiom |Ml rnif .Inytncnl wilh (L 
Respondent Salt Lake Community College (hereinafter "S.l i' <' '' i Mr 
3 
immediately filed for unemployment compensation with Respondent Department 
of Workforce Services. (R.l-4). On August 19, 2008, following an informal 
telephonic hearing, Administrative Law Judge Gary S. Gibbs (hereinafter "A.L.J.") 
of the Department of Workforce Services rendered his Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law denying Mr. Nigohosian unemployment compensation. (R. 
182-183). 
Mr. Nighosian appealed the denial to the Respondent Workforce Appeals 
Board (hereinafter "Appeals Board"). (R. 186). On September 18,2008, the 
Appeals Board affirmed the ALJ's denial of unemployment compensation. (R. 
195-200). 
On September 26, 2008, Mr. Nigohosian filed a Motion to Reconsider and to 
Reopen the Hearing with the Appeals Board. (R.205-211). The S.L.C.C. did not 
respond to this Motion. On October 16, 2008, without explanation, the Appeals 
Board denied Mr. Nigohosian's Motion (R. 213-215). This Petition for Review 
followed. (R. 216-217). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Nigohosian went to work as an economics instructor at the S.L.C.C. on 
September 11, 1994. When his employment was terminated by the S.L.C.C. on 
June 4, 2008, Mr. Nigohosian was a tenured associate professor. (R. 5-21). As a 
part of his employment, Mr. Nigohosian participated in the "concurrent enrollment 
program", which allowed high school students to earn college credit. Mr. 
Nigohosian would counsel high school teachers, provide resource material, and 
visit the high school classes. To get paid for these services, Mr. Nigohosian had to 
fill out and file "Liaison Visit Report Form". (R. 32-39, 99). S.L.C.C. initially 
believed these forms were filed fraudulently in an effort by Mr. Nigohosian to be 
paid for services not rendered. Mr. Nigohosian believed he had filled out a 
confusing and ambiguous form correctly for the services he had rendered. After a 
precursory investigation, Mr. Nigohosian was fired by S.L.C.C. on June 4, 2008. 
(R. 183, 189-193). 
Immediately following his firing, Mr. Nigohosian pursued the internal 
grievance process established by the S.L.C.C. to get his job back. In compliance 
with federal and state requirements, the grievance process culminates with a "due 
process hearing". 
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The all-day, due process hearing was held on September 14, 2009 before a 
panel of seven (7) S.L.C.C. professors. Most of the witnesses at the S.L.C.C. 
hearing were witnesses who testified before the A.LJ. at the telephonic hearing 
with the Department of Workforce Services. On September 17, 2008, the S.L.C.C. 
faculty panel made its recommendations. The recommendations include the find 
that Mr. Nigohosian's dismissal from S.L.C.C. seems "unconscionably over 
reactive". (R. 205-211). 
The day after the S.L.C.C. faculty panel issued its recommendation. On 
September 18, 2008, Mr. Nigohosian filed, with the Appeals Board, a copy of the 
recommendation. (R. 201-209). However, that same day the Appeals Board issued 
its decision without considering the recommendation from the S.L.C.C. faculty 
panel. (R. 195-200). Therefore, on September 26, 2008, Mr. Nigohosian filed a 
Motion to reopen the hearing for purposes of supplementing the record with the 
S.L.C.C. faculty panel recommendations so the Appeals Board could be taken into 
account by the Appeals Board in any reconsideration of its initial decision of 
September 18, 2008 (R.205-211). 
The S.L.C.C. did not file any response to Mr. Nigohosian's Motion. On 
October 16, 2008, with one sentence stating "The Claimant's [Nigohosian's] 
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request for reconsideration is denied", the Appeals Board rejected the Motion. (R. 
2-3-215). As a result, Mr. Nigohosian filed this Petition for Review. (R. 216-217). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
By statute and administrative rule, records in unemployment benefit cases 
should be liberally re-opened to include new relevant evidence. The 
recommendation from the S.L.C.C. faculty panel is such evidence. The Appeals 
Board abused its discretion by not including the recommendation in the record in 
this matter. This Court should remand this case to the Appeals Board with 
instructions to include the recommendation in the record so that the Appeals Board 
could properly reconsider this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
THE APPEALS BOARD ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY REFUSING TO 
REOPEN THE RECORD TO INCLUDE THE FACULTY PANEL 
RECOMMENDATIONS. 
Mr. Nigohosian's efforts to collect unemployment benefits are not unlike 
thousands of others. Mr. Nigohosian believed his employment was terminated 
without sufficient cause. The administration of S.L.C.C. believed they had 
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sufficient cause for the firing. However, unlike most employment situations in 
Utah, the employer, S.L.C.C, has a sophisticated process for an aggrieved 
employee to challenge his firing. 
In the context of awarding unemployment benefits, the law as to whether or 
not an employee was fired for cause is very well established. The A.L.J, and the 
Appeals Board, in their two main decisions, state the law accurately. The law is 
also codified in Utah Administrative Code R 994-405-202. The critical portion of 
this rule is quoted as follows: 
(2) Knowledge. 
The claimant must have had knowledge of the conduct the employer 
expected. There does not need to be evidence of a deliberate intent to 
harm the employer; however, it must be shown the claimant should 
have been able to anticipate the negative effect of the conduct. 
Generally, knowledge may not be established unless the employer 
gave 
a clear explanation of the expected behavior or had a written policy, 
except in the case of a violation of a universal standard of conduct. A 
specific warning is one way to show the claimant had knowledge of 
the 
expected conduct. After a warning the claimant should have been 
given an opportunity to correct the objectionable conduct. If the 
employer had a progressive disciplinary procedure in place at the time 
of the separation, it generally must have been followed for knowledge 
to be established, except in the case of very severe infractions, 
including criminal actions. 
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The dispute between Mr. Nigohosian and the administration of S.L.C.C. 
center around Mr. Nigohosian's "knowledge" when he filled out and filed the two 
report forms. The administration argues that Mr. Nigohosian knew exactly what 
he was doing when he "inappropriately" filled out the forms. Mr. Nigohosian 
argues that he thought he was filling out the forms accurately for the services he 
was rendering in light of the ambiguity and confusion of the forms. This dispute 
is, of course, fact sensitive. 
A critical and relevant fact in all such disputes is whether the employer 
believes the firing to be with or without sufficient cause. In the case at hand, a 
recommendation, from a panel created by the employer, finds that the firing of Mr. 
Nigohosian to be inappropriate. This recommendation came after a full day 
hearing, involving many witnesses and documents, involving three attorneys, and a 
panel of seven (7) employees of S.L.C.C. Unfortunately, the faculty panel came to 
their decision at the same time that the Appeals Board rendered its decision. 
The law in unemployment benefit matters anticipates that changing or 
developed facts may need to be added to the record in order to render an 
appropriate and just decision. Utah Code Ann. §35 A-1-304(2) reads as follows: 
On appeal, the Workforce Appeals Board may on the basis of the 
9 
evidence previously submitted in the case, or upon the basis of any 
additional evidence it requires: 
(a) affirm the decision of the administrative law judge; 
(b) modify the decision of the administrative law judge; or 
(c) reverse the findings, conclusions, and decision of the administrative 
law judge. 
This statute specifically authorizes the Appeals Board to accept additional 
evidence such as the faculty panel recommendation. Additionally, the Department 
of Workforce Services is directed by statute to maintain continuing jurisdiction 
over the award of unemployment benefits. Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-406(2)(b) 
reads: 
Upon its own initiative or upon application of any party affected, the 
division may on the basis of change in conditions or because of a 
mistake as to facts, review a decision allowing or disallowing in whole 
or in part a claim for benefits. 
This statute specifically states the reason for why new facts may need to be 
added to a record. 
The Department of Workforce Services promulgated rules to implement the 
above statutory changes. Utah Administrative Code R 994-508-117(5) reads as 
follows: 
The ALJ may reopen a hearing on his or her own motion if it appears 
necessary to take continuing jurisdiction or if the failure to reopen would 
10 
be an affront to fairness. 
Utah Administrative Code R 994-508-118(1) through (3) reads: 
(1) The request to reopen will be granted if the party was prevented from 
appearing at the hearing due to circumstances beyond the party's control. 
(2) The request may be granted upon such terms as are just for any of the 
following reasons: mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, or 
any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the decision. The 
determination of what sorts of neglect will be considered excusable is an 
equitable one, taking into account all of the relevant circumstances 
including: 
(a) the danger that the party not requesting reopening will be harmed by 
reopening. 
(b) the length of the delay caused by the party's failure to participate 
including the length of time to request a reopening; 
(c) the reason for the request including whether it was within the reasonable 
control of the party requesting reopening; 
(d) whether the party requesting reopening acted in good faith; 
(e) whethertheparty was represented at the time of the hearing. Attorneys 
and professional representatives are expected to have greater knowledge of 
Department procedures and rules and are therefore held to a higher standard; 
and 
(f) whether based on the evidence of record and the parties' arguments or 
statements, taking additional evidence might affect the outcome of the case. 
(3) Requests to reopen are remedial in nature and thus must be liberally 
construed in favor of providing parties with an opportunity to be heard and 
11 
present their case. Any doubt must be resolved in favor of granting 
reopening. 
Although the two above rules apply specifically to hearings before the 
A.L.J., when the matter has been appealed to the Appeals Board, the Appeals 
Board has similar authority to reopen matters to supplement the record. Utah 
Administrative Code R994-508-401(2)(b) and (3) read as follows: 
(2) After a determination or decision has become final, the Department 
my, on its own initiative or upon the request of any interested party, review a 
determination or decision and issue a new decision or determination, if 
appropriate, if there has been a change of conditions or a mistake as to facts. 
The reconsideration must be made at, or with the approval of, the level 
where the last decision on the case was made or is currently pending. 
(a) A change in conditions may include a change in the law which 
would make reconsideration necessary in fairness to the parties who were 
adversely affected by the law change. A change in conditions may also 
include an unforeseeable change in the personal circumstances of the 
claimant or employer which would have made it reasonable not to file a 
timely appeal. 
(b) A mistake as to facts is limited to material information which was the 
basis for the decision. A mistake as to facts may include information which 
is misunderstood or misinterpreted, but does not include an error in the 
application of the act or the rules provided the decision is made under the 
correct section of the act. A mistake as to facts can only be found if it was 
inadvertent. If the party alleging the mistake intentionally provided the 
wrong information or intentionally withheld information, the Department 
will not exercise jurisdiction under this paragraph. 
12 
(3) The Department is not required to take jurisdiction in all cases where 
there is a change in conditions or a mistake as to facts. The Department will 
weigh the administrative burden of making a redetermination against the 
requirements of fairness and the opportunities of the parties affected to file 
an appeal. The Department may decline to take jurisdiction if the 
redetermination would have little or no effect. 
The S.L.C.C. faculty panel recommendations were not available when the 
A.L.J, conducted his hearing. The recommendation was available while the 
Appeals Board still had jurisdiction and prior the Board's decision becoming final. 
Unfortunately, we do not know why the Appeals Board refused to reopen the 
record to consider the recommendation. The S.L.C.C, when given an opportunity 
to oppose Mr. Nigohosian's Motion, provided no response to the Motion. The 
Appeals Board provided no explanation as to its reasoning. 
The refusal of the Appeals Board to add the recommendation to the record is 
reviewable by this Court under an abuse of discretion standard. In such cases, it 
means that the Court will grant to the Appeals Board "moderate deference and will 
uphold [the Board's] decision so long as it is within the realm of reasonableness 
and rationability." Arrow Legal Solutions Group P.C. vs. Department of 
Workforce Services, et. al„ 180 P. 3d 830, 832 (Utah Crt. App, 2007). However, 
the Appeals Board made no findings of fact or conclusion of law as to why the 
13 
Board did not add the faculty panel recommendations to the record. It is the 
Board's obligation to do so. Adams v. Board of Review of Indus Comm 821 P. 2d 
1 (Utah, 1991). Absent such articulation from the Appeals Board, this Court 
should remand this matter to the Board with instructions to add the 
recommendation to the record and reconsider the Board's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above, this Court should recommend this matter be 
remanded to the Appeals Board with instructions to the Appeal Board to reopen the 
record to include the S.L.C.C. faculty panel recommendation so an appropriate 
reconsideration can be held of the initial Appeals Board's decision. 
DATED this ^ 3 d a y of February, 2009. 
Joseph E.'TIatch 
Attorney for Robert H. Nigohosian 
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DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES 
APPEALS UNIT 
Decision of Administrative Law Judge 
Appellant 
ROBERT H NIGOHOSIAN 
PO BOX 622 
PARK CITY UT 84060-0622 
Respondent 
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
%EMPLOYER ADVOCATES LLC 
PO BOX 25236 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84125-0236 
S.S.A,NO: XXX-XX-5265 CASE NO: 08-A-04622 
APPEAL DECISION: Benefits are denied. 
CASE HISTORY: 
Appearances: 
Issues to be Decided: 
Claimant/Employer 
35A-4-405(2)(a) Discharge 
The original Department decision denied unemployment insurance benefits on the grounds the Claimant was 
discharged for just cause. No charge decision was made due to the Employer being a reimbursable 
Employer. 
APPEAL RIGHTS: The following decision will become final unless, within 30 days from August 19, 
2008, further written appeal is received by the Workforce Appeals Board (PO Box 45244, Salt Lake City, 
UT 84145-0244; FAX 801-526-9244; or online at http://www.jobs.utali.gov/appeaJs) setting forth the 
grounds upon which the appeal is made. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Prior to filing a claim for unemployment insurance benefits effective June 8, 200 8, the Claimant last worked 
for Salt Lake Community College from September 21, 1994, to June 4, 2008. The Claimant worked as an 
associateprofessor earning approximately $47,500 per year, The Claimantwas separated from the Employer 
for the reasons described below, 
The Claimant participated in-a program sponsored by the Employer where the Claimant would work with 
high schools in a concurrent enrollment program. The Claimant was entitled to receive $ 125 per month by 
visiting the classroom at a high school and performing an evaluation of the instructor. In order to be paid 
- i l * -
Nigohosian, Robert H. ~2^ 08-A-04622 
for the visit, the Claimant was required to complete a form entitled Liaison Visit Report Form. The 
Claimant was also entitled to receive additional pay for working in this program on special projects for the 
high school teachers. The Claimant was also required to list the work that he performed in special projects 
on the Liaison Visit Report Form, 
On February 26 and February 27,2008, the Claimant turned in two Liaison Visit Report Forms covering the 
Claimant's work in two high schools. On each of the forms, the Claimant described additional projects the 
Claimant had worked with high schools relating to a website. The form also asked the Claimant to report 
whether the instructor was using the approved text book; was using the approved syllabus; and whether the 
instructor was meeting the Salt Lake Community College curriculum requirements. The Claimant marked 
these boxes "yes" on each of the forms. The Claimant also marked a box (<yes5> indicating that students are 
assessed using the same methods and criteria as their on-campus counterparts. The Claimant also responded 
to portions of the form requesting information about the subject matter and delivery style. The Claimant 
responded "yes" on both forms to the question of whether the course was consistent with the on-campus 
course. On one of tire forms, in response to comments and observation, the Claimant indicated the instructor 
is well organized, and the students demonstrate respect. 
For each of these dates the Claimant turned in forms, he did not make a classroom visit as required by the 
Employer. The Claimant knew that he was not allowed to be paid for classroom visits if he had not actually 
visited the classroom. The Claimant had the instructor sign the forms prior to the scheduled day of the visit 
and did not make the visit. The Claimant did not indicate on the form that he had not visited the classrooms. 
After turning in the forms, the Employer began to investigate the forms to determine whether or not the 
Claimant had worked on special projects and whether or not he had visited the classrooms. On March 14, 
2008, the Employer met with the Claimant During this meeting the Claimant admitted that he had not 
visited the classrooms. The Claimant indicated that he did not intend to be paid for the special projects, but 
listed this on the forms for informational purposes only. The Claimant told the Employer that he intended 
to visit the classrooms, and felt that he should be compensated for his attempts to visit the classrooms. 
The Employer continued to investigate the CI aimanf s conduct. The Employer contacted a law enforcement 
official to conduct an investigation, and placed the Claimant on paid administrative leave. The Employer 
made the decision on June 4, 2008, to discharge the Claimant for attempting to be paid for visits to 
classrooms that he had not actually visited. Because the Employer discovered that the Claimant had not 
visited the classrooms, the Claimant was not paid for the visits. 
The Claimant's conduct of turning in forms to be paid for visits that he did not make harmed the trust 
relationship between the Employer and the Claimant. The Claimant5 s conduct put at risk the Claimant being 
paid for work he did not perform. The Claimant's conduct also posed a risk of harming the Employer's 
relationship with the high schools. 
REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Unemployment Insurance benefits must be denied if the Employer had just cause for discharging the 
Employee. In order to have just cause for discharge pursuant to Section 35A-4405(2)(a) of the Utah 
Employment Security Act, there must be fault on the part of the Employee involved. The basic factors as 
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established by the Rules pertaining to Section 35A-4-405(2)(a), which are essential for a determination of 
ineligibility under the definition of just cause, are: 
(a) Culpability. The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing 
the employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interests . . . 
(b) Knowledge. The worker must have had a knowledge of the conduct which the 
employer expected . . . 
(c) Control The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the claimant's 
control. . . 
The Employer has a rightful interest in requiring employees to be honest and trustworthy in their dealings 
with their Employer. The Claimant's conduct of completing the forms and attempting to be paid for work 
that he did not perform was directly contrary to the Employer's rightful interests. The Administrative Law 
Judge was not persuaded that the Claimant did not know how to fill out the form. The Administrative Law 
Judge finds that the Claimant clearly intended to convey to the Employer by completing the forms that he 
had visited the classrooms and wished to be compensated for those visits. By answering the questions that 
related to classroom visits, the Claimant clearly conveyed that he had made the visits. The Administrative 
Law Judge found the Employer's testimony to be credible that the Claimant reported to the Employer that 
he did not intend to be paid for the special projects. This credibly rebuts the Claimant's argument that he 
completed the form to be paid for the special projects, and not for the purpose of being paid for the visits. 
The Claimant's conduct harmed the trust relationship between the Employer and the Claimant. The 
Claimant's conduct was an act of dishonesty that was so serious that continuingthe employmentrelationship 
would have jeopardized the Employer's rightful interests. The element of culpability is established. 
The Claimant was aware of the conduct expected of him by the Employer. The Claimant knew that he was 
not allowed to be paid for classroom visits when he did not actually visit the classroom. The Claimant knew 
that he was completing the forms in a way that would convey to the Employer that he had made the visits 
to the classrooms. The element of knowledge is established. 
The Claimant was in full control of the conduct and circumstances that resulted in his discharge. The 
Claimant could have refrained from turning in the forms prior to making the visits to the classrooms. The 
Claimant could have also indicated on the form that he did not visit the classroom prior to turning in the 
forms. The element of control is established 
The Employer has established by a preponderance of the evidence the elements of culpability, knowledge, 
and control. Just cause is established. Benefits are denied. 
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DECISION AND ORDER: 
The Department representative's decision denying unemployment benefits pursuant to Section 35A-4-
405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment Security Act is affirmed. Benefits are denied effective June 8,2008, and 
continuing until the Claimant has earned at least six times his weekly benefit amount in bona fide covered 
employment and is otherwise eligible. 
/ w r y S. Gibbs 
Aditfuiistrative Law Judge 
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DECISION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD: 
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge is affirmed. 
Benefits are denied. 
HISTORY OF CASE: 
In a decision dated August 19,2008, Case No. 08-A-04622, the Administrative Law Judge affirmed 
the Department decision and denied unemployment insurance benefits to the Claimant effective 
June 8,2008. 
JURISDICTION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD: 
The Workforce Appeals Board has authority to review the Administrative Law Judge's decision 
pursuant to §35A-4-508(4) and (5) of the Utah Employment Security Act and the Utah 
Administrative Code (1997) pertaining theteto. 
CLAIMANT APPEAL FILED: August 25,2008. 
ISSUES BEFORE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD AND APPLICABLE PROVISIONS 
OF UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT: 
1. Did the Employer have just cause for discharging the Claimant pursuant to the provisions of 
§35A-4-405(2)(a)? 
FACTUAL FINDINGS; 
The Workforce Appeals Board adopts in full the factual findings of the Administrative Law Judge. 
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REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The Claimant worked for this Employer as an economics professor for nearly 14 years. He was 
discharged for falsifying pay documents. The Department and the Administrative Law Judge denied 
benefits and the Claimant filed this appeal 
The Claimant received a salary and was entitled to an extra sum for visiting high school classrooms 
and evaluating the instructor and class materials. He was compensated per visit. He could also 
request payment for time spent on special projects. He was compensated by the hour for special 
projects. To receive compensation for special projects and/or class visits, the Claimant filled out a 
form entitled "Liaison Visit Report Form." The form wa$ a filMn-the-blank type form. 
The Claimant submitted two questionable forms for payment. One form, Exhibit 23fl dated 
February 26, 2Q08> listed the high school as Copper Hills. The form has a blank space after the 
woids: "Hours spent on projects related to this class in addition to class visits." In the blank the 
Claimant wrote the numeral "2." On several other places on that form, the Claimant wrote 
statements and checked boxes which indicated he visited and observed a class. The form was signed 
by the Claimant and the instructor, Exhibit 99 is similar except it is for East High School and 
contains the date of February 27,2008, The Claimant did not visit either of those schools on those 
dates. 
The Claimant argues on appeal, as he did during the hearing, that the form was confusing, he was 
not properly trained in how to complete the form, and he did not intend the forms in question to be 
interpreted as a request for payment for a classroom visit. The Claimant's arguments are 
unpersuasive. The form is very clear on its face. The form states "hours spent on projects related 
to this class in addition to class visits" [emphasis provided] The Claimant's argument that he was 
confused and in need of training on how to fill oat this form is disingenuous. In addition to the 
printed material, the Claimant filled in the blanks with phrases like "Instructoi is well-oriented -
student demonstrate respect" that the "delivery style" was "lecture and discussion." 
The Claimant states that he had the instructors sign the forms in advance in the event he had to leave 
the classroom early. Singe he did not even visit the classes on the days in question, he should not 
have used a pre-signed form obtained by misrepresenting how the form was to be used. 
The Claimant's credibility is severely challenged by his own actions in this case, If he only wanted 
compensation for the two hours spent on special projects, he would not have filled in the other 
blanks on the form. He could have, and should have> noted on the form that he was not seeking 
compensation for a class visit Instead he prepared a form that, on its face, clearly indicated he 
visited the class. 
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Department rules provide: 
R994-405-202. Just Cause. 
To establish just cause for a discharge, each of the following three elements 
must be satisfied: 
(1) Culpability, 
The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing the 
employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. If the 
conduct was an isolated incident of poor judgment and there was no expectation it 
would be continued or repeated, potential harm may not be shown. The claimant's 
prior work record is an important factor in detennining whether the conduct was an 
isolated incident or a good faith error in judgment. An employer might not be able 
to demonstrate that a single violation, even though harmful, would be repeated by a 
long-term employee with an established pattern of complying with the employees 
rules In this instance, depending on the seriousness of the conduct, it may foot be 
necessary for the employer to discharge the claimant to avoid future harm. 
(2) Knowledge. 
The claimant must have had knowledge of the conduct the employer 
expected. There does not need to be evidence of a deliberate intent to harm the 
employer; however, it must be shown the claimant should have been able to 
anticipate the negative effect of the conduct. Generally, knowledge may not be 
established unless the employer gave a clear explanation of the expected behavior or 
had a written policy, except in the case of a violation of a universal standard of 
conduct. A specific warning is one way to show the claimant had knowledge of the 
expected conduct. After a warning the claimant should have been given an 
opportunity to correct the objectionable conduct. If the employer had a progressive 
disciplinaiy procedure in place at the time of the separation, it generally must have 
been followed for knowledge to be established, except in the case of very severe 
infractions^ including criminal actions, 
(3) Control 
(a) The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the 
claimant's control Isolated instances of carelessness or good faith errors in judgment 
are not sufficient to establish just cause for discharge. However, continued 
inefficiency, repeated carelessness or evidence of a lack of care expected of a 
O8-B-0Q427 
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reasonable person in a similar circumstance may satisfy the element of control if the 
claimant had the ability to perfonn satisfactorily. 
(b) The Department recognizes that in order to maintain efficiency it may 
be necessary to discharge workers who do not meet performance standards. While 
such a circumstance may provide a basis for discharge, this does not mean benefits 
will be denied. To satisfy the element of control in cases involving a discharge due 
to unsatisfactory work performance, it must be shown the claimant had the ability to 
perfonn the job duties in a satisfactory manner. In general, if the claimant made a 
good faith effort to meet the job requirements but failed to do so due to a lack of skill 
or ability and a discharge results just cause is not established. 
The Claimant knew, or should have known, that the forms he presented were deceptive. He knew 
he should not submit deceptive forms. The knowledge prong of the just cause test was proved. 
The Claimant had control over his actions. While he argues he did not receive proper training on 
how to fill out the forms, the forms are self-explanatory. He could have clearly written what he did 
on the forms. The control prong was proved. 
The Employer was clearly harmed by the Claimant's action$. Even though the Claimant did not 
receive payment for the class visits in question, he misrepresented his actions m what clearly appears 
as an attempt to obtain compensation he was not due. This destroyed the Employer's trust in the 
Claimant and once rent, it is impossible to repair. The culpability prong of the just cause test was 
proved. 
Havmg proved all three elements of the just cause test, the Claimant is not eligible for 
unemployment benefits. The reasoning and conclusions of law of the Administrative Law Judge are 
adopted in full. 
DECISION: 
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge denying unemployment insurance benefits to the 
Claimant effective June 8,2008, under the provisions of §35A~4-405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment 
Security Act, is affirmed. 
APPEAL RIGHTS: 
Pursuant to §63-46b-13(l)(a) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, you may request 
reconsideration of this decision within 20 days fiom the date this decision is issued. Your request 
for reconsideration must be in writing and must state the specific grounds upon which relief is 
requested. The request must be filed with the Workforce Appeals Board at 140 East 300 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, or may be mailed to the Workforce Appeals Board at P.O. Box 45244, 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0244. A copy of the request for reconsideration must also be mailed to 
each party by the person i^akmg the request If the Workforce Appeals Boatd doea not issue an 
order within 20 days after the filing of the request, the request for reconsideration shall be considered 
to be denied pursuant to §63-46b-13(3)(b) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. The filing 
of a request for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of this order, If a 
request for reconsideration is made, the Workforce Appeals Board will i$$ue another decision, This 
decision will set forth the rights of further appeal to the Court of Appeals and time limitation for 
such an appeal. 
You may appeal this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals, Your appeal must be submitted in 
writing within 30 days of the date this decision i$ issued. The Court of Appeals is located on the 
fifth floor of the Scott M. Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, P. O. Box 140230, 
Salt Lake City> Utah 84114-0230. The appeal must show the Workforce Appeals Board, 
Department of Workforce Services and any other party to the proceeding as Respondents. To file 
an appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for Writ 
of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35 A-4-508(8) of the Utah Employment 
Security Act; §63-46b-16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act; and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules 
9 and 24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD 
Date Issued: September 18,2008 kH ^ ^J 
TV/CN/DW/GG/SP/if 
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SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, : 
EMPLOYER 
DECISION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD: 
Claimant's request for reconsideration is denied. 
HISTORY OF CASE: 
In a letter received September 29, 2008, Claimant Robert H. Nigohosian requested reconsideration 
of the decision of the Workforce Appeals Board issued in this case on September 18, 2008. The 
decision of the Workforce Appeals Board was based on a review of a decision of an Administrative 
Law Judge after a formal hearing. 
JURISDICTION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD: 
The Board has jurisdiction to review the request for reconsideration pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §63-46b-13(3) on the grounds that the Board's decision was final agency action within 
the meaning and intent of that section of law. 
DECISION: 
The Claimant's request for reconsideration is denied. The decision of the Workforce Appeals Board 
dated September 18, 2008, remains in effect. 
APPEAL RIGHTS: 
You may appeal this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. Your appeal must be submitted in 
writing within 30 days of the date this decision is issued. The Court of Appeals is located on the 
fifth floor of the Scott M. Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, P. O. Box 140230, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230. The appeal must show the Workforce Appeals Board, 
Department of Workforce Services and any other party to the proceeding as Respondents. To file 
an appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for Writ 
of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35A-4-508(8) of the Utah Employment 
Security Act; §63-46b-16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act; and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules 
-25-
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of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules 9 
and 24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
WORKFO 
Date Issued: October 16, 2008 
TV/CN/DW/GG/SP/cd 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I herebvcertify that I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the following on 
this 16th day of October, 2008, by mailing the same, postage 
prepaid, United States mail to: 
JOSEPH E HATCH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
5295 S COMMERCE DR STE 200 
MURRAY UT 84107 
ROBERT H NIGOHOSIAN 
PO BOX 622 
PARK CITY UT 84060-0622 
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
C/O EMPLOYER ADVOCATES INC 
PO BOX 25236 
- SALT LAKE CITY UT 84125-0236 
dflyw^Qdk<wv^x>y 
September 17, 2008 
RECOMMENDATION FROM SITTING HEARING COMMITTEE 
Hearing for Robert Nigohosian Friday, September 12, 2008 
As a result of the hearing for Bob Nigohosian, the Sitting Hearing Committee 
recommends that the College reconsider his dismissal. 
The College dismissed Mr. Nigohosian as a result of two concurrent enrollment forms he 
submitted in February. Administrators believed that, with the submission of those forms, 
he intended to commit "theft by deception" (p. 2 of College Position Statement) in 
suggesting that he had visited two concurrent classes that he had, in fact, not visited. 
Upon review, this Hearing Committee does not find the issue to be so simple. What we 
do find is that both concurrent enrollment contracts and visit-report forms are vague and 
ambiguous, and might invite different interpretations of what actually constitutes a visit, 
and how to report ancillary work on the same visit form. The hearing on Friday revealed 
that, in fact, a training session was held on April 28, 2008 (after the conflict with Mr. 
Nigohosian) in an attempt to address some of the confusion that many concurrent 
enrollment instructors have. 
The hearing also revealed that Mr. Nigohosian may have been overseeing as many as ten 
concurrent instructors, in addition to teaching his scheduled classes; this Committee 
believes that to be an impossible workload, one which supervisors should not have 
allowed. 
The College Tenure Document, Section 8.3.15.1, states that "the administration has the 
burden of proof to show that.. .reasonable cause exists"; we do not believe that the 
administration showed sufficient proof that Mr. Nigohosian intentionally tried to receive 
pay for work he had not done. We did gather that Mr. Nigohosian has been overseeing 
concurrent enrollment classes for at least a few years, and we saw no evidence that 
anything has been problematic before. This decision, as far as we could tell in the 
hearing, seems to have been made on a "he said.. .she said" basis, without sufficient 
evidence to support findings (we did not hear from either of the concurrent enrollment 
instructors who were mentioned in the two forms). And we find that to be greatly 
inadequate cause for removing a tenured faculty member who has been employed at the 
College for fourteen years. 
In fact, based partly on the lack of proof, and partly on Mr. Nigohosian's tenure at the 
College, we strongly believe that termination is far too severe for what may or may not 
have been an indiscretion. The hearing statement from the College says that "it was 
determined that termination was the only appropriate disciplinary action" (p.3 of College 
Position Statement). This Committee strongly disagrees with that statement, and strongly 
believes that the imposed sanctions were too severe. 
That same Position Statement cited the College Document, Section 10.3.4: "to remove 
from Institutional employment faculty members whose inability to continue beneficial 
service to the Institution has been clearly demonstrated." The Hearing Committee saw no 
evidence that such an inability had been demonstrated, based on only two forms, which 
were admittedly confusing, and reflected a minute part of a faculty member's entire 
college involvement. 
At best, there may have been some misrepresentation on one portion of the two forms in 
question, but the overall ambiguity makes that questionable. According to the Tenure 
Document, section 10.1, "The following sanctions are permissible for a violation of 
standards... 
(a) verbal censure 
(b) written reprimand 
(c) suspension with pay (not exceeding one year) 
(d) probation 
(e) reduction in status 
(f) reduction in compensation 
(g) suspension without pay (not exceeding one year) 
(h) dismissal 
If, indeed, there was misrepresentation, whether innocent or intentional, that may have 
certainly merited some sort of sanctions from the college. It may have been logical to 
remove Mr. Nigohosian from the Concurrent Enrollment Program. If he had already 
received the $250, it may have been logical to have him return it, perhaps with interest, 
until the situation was resolved; but, in fact, he had not yet received the money. Referring 
to the possibilities above, it makes sense that a conversation, and perhaps a milder form 
of sanction may have been appropriate. Section 10.4.3 of the Tenure Document calls for 
"Fairness to the faculty member involved, including such issues as personal 
circumstances, prior service to the institution, and any other relevant matters to the 
situation and the faculty." Mr. Nigohosian has been at Salt Lake Community College for 
fourteen years, and he is tenured faculty. To jump all the way through the list to 
"dismissal" seems unconscionably over reactive. 
This Sitting Hearing Committee believes that the termination of Bob Nigohosian is 
extreme, and that the College should seriously reconsider that action. 
Respectfully, 
The College Sitting Hearing Committee 
Sue Briggs Kathy Eppler Maryln Harmer 
Dean Huber Art Kanehara Rachel Lawyer 
Ron Valcarce 
